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Private Enforcement of the Social Contract:
DeShlney and the Second Amendment Right to
Own Firearms
David E. Murley*
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall
not be infringed.'
The United States Supreme Court has been derelict in its duty to
interpret the right to keep and bear arms. 2 It has not decided a
Second Amendment case since 1939, 3 and has refused on numerous
occasions to grant certiorari to gun control cases. 4 The Court must
* M.A. Michigan State University, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center. The author
currently serves on the legal staff of the Honorable John M. Engler, Governor of Michigan.
All views expressed are solely those of the author. The author would also like to thank
Professor Don Wallace of Georgetown University Law Center for his invaluable assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
2. Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "It is emphatically the province and the duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule ... This is of the very essence of judicial
duty." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
3. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
4.
Petitions for certiorari were filed in twenty-three cases after the MiWer decision.
Twenty-one petitions were denied. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (P.R. 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); United States v. Lauchli, 444 F2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1971); United States v. Tomlin, 454 F2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972); Cody v. United States, 460 F2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1010 (1972); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, Pa., 477 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 843 (1973); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Oakes, 564 E2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978); Quilci v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Rose, 695 E2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 836 (1983); United States v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
960 (1988); United States v. Hale, 978 F2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997
(1993); United States v. Farmer, 1 F.3d 1234 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 242
(1997), rehg denied, 118 S. Ct. 594 (1997); Slesarik v. Luna County, 13 F3d 32 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1072 (1994); United States v. Vargas, 19 F.3d 32 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, sub nom. Berduzco v. US, 512 U.S. 1240 (1994); Love v. Pepersack, 47 E3d 120 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 260 (1995); United States v. Marchant, 55 F3d 509 (10th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 260 (1995); United States v. Farrell, 69 F3d 891 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:827

cease its two-hundred year neglect of the right to keep and bear
arms and delineate the implications of the Second Amendment. 5
The Court's unwillingness to interpret the Second Amendment
has resulted in a ridiculous national debate over the right to keep
and bear arms. Second Amendment interpretations generally do not
differ over details, such as "where the line is drawn," as one might
expect with a question about free speech or the right to an
attorney. Few academics address the Second Amendment; most
seem to ignore it when discussing fundamental rights Americans
possess under the Constitution. 6 Some scholars, in discussing the
right to bear arms, dismiss the Amendment as a relic harking back
to an era when states needed militias to guard against federal
government encroachment. Others, often coming from the opposite
side of the political spectrum, ignore the Amendment's language
about the necessity of a militia and base their arguments on the
words "the right of the people." Regardless of viewpoint, the legal
issues in the debate require clarification before any meaningful
dialogue is possible.
By considering the origins of the Second Amendment, its relation
to the guarantees of other fundamental rights, and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of it, this article will answer the question:
Does the Second Amendment recognize a right to armed
self-defense? The answer is an unequivocal "yes." The Second
denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996); United States v. Rybar, 103 F3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 46 (1997); United States v. Kirk, 105 F3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); United States v. Wright, 117 F3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 584 (1997).
The Court granted certiorari in two cases, but did not address the Second Amendment
question. United States v. Tot, 131 F3d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. granted, 317 U.S. 623 (1943),
rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1939); United States v. Synnes, 438 F2d 764 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. granted and vacated, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972).
5.
This underdeveloped Second Amendment case law is analogous to the Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment before the early Twentieth Century. Prior to that time,
"there was still to issue from the Supreme Court a single decision establishing the First
Amendment as an amendment of any genuine importance at all." William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the PersonalRight to Arms, 43 DUKE UJ. 1236, 1239 (1994).
6. Sanford Levinson has stated, "I think it is accurate to say that no one recognized by
the legal community as a major writer on Constitutional Law has deigned to turn his or her
talents to a full consideration of the Amendment." Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637 (1989). Levinson also quotes Professor L H. LaRue as
stating "The Second Amendment is not taken seriously by most scholars." Id. at 640 (citing
L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L REv. 373, 375
(1978)).
Levinson noted that the "leading" casebooks and treatises barely, if at all, analyze the
Second Amendment. Levinson, supra, at 639, n.14, 642 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1988); J. NowA, ET AL, CONsTITuTIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1986)).
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Amendment provides a guarantee that citizens may keep arms for
their self-defense against violence that our government is unable, or
unwilling, to prevent.
More importantly, this article introduces a novel interpretation of
the Second Amendment. Instead of merely reciting the Court's
holdings regarding an individual right to self-defense, this article
will analyze that right from the basis of the government's duty to
protect citizens from harm, as delineated in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County.7 The implications of DeShaney virtually
mandate an individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment. Even if the dissent's position in DeShaney were
adopted, the result would still be an individual right to own arms.
Ironically, DeShaney has the potential to be the most important
Second Amendment case yet decided but never mentions the
Second Amendment.
Part I of this article analyzes whether the Second Amendment is
a "collective" right, applying only to the states, or an "individual"
right, possessed by all citizens. Part II examines the scant Supreme
Court case law interpreting the right to keep and bear arms. This
section also examines whether the Second Amendment prohibits
state and local bans on firearms. Part III argues that a strong
individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment is
mandated in light of DeShaney that limits the government's
obligation to protect the citizenry.
1. DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECT AN INDivIDuAL RIGHT TO

BEAR ARMS?
A.

Introduction

The perplexing language of the Second Amendment confuses the
issue of what rights a citizen has to bear arms. Does the Second
Amendment protect an individual right to bear arms, or merely
guarantee that states will be free to maintain a militia? To one
unfamiliar with the origins of the Second Amendment, terms such
as "militia" and "right of the people" seem to be mutually exclusive.
This is not so; rather, the two phrases are complementary. The
Amendment was intended to protect both an individual right and a
group right - a right belonging to the "body of the people."
Because this article focuses on the individual right recognized by
the Second Amendment, it will not analyze the "well-regulated
7.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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militia" aspect of the Amendment.8 Perhaps the Founders intended
the militia to describe the body of arms-bearing citizens, or a
loosely-organized group that could be called by Congress in time of
emergency. The militia envisioned by the Founders might be
relevant today, or it could be completely unimportant. Regardless
of what the Founders intended concerning the militia, they also
wished to recognize an individual right to bear arms, a right that
predated the Constitution.9
B.

Collective Rights

"Collective rights" proponents view the Second Amendment as a
guarantee to states that they could maintain armies as a check on
federal tyranny. Relying on the phrase "[a] well-regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state," this school
contends that the only right the Second Amendment confers is for
states to maintain a militia, which they define as organized,
government-sponsored military units such as the National Guard. 10
In addition, this school sees the Second Amendment tied to Article
I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution, which authorizes
Congress to call out the militia and to organize, arm, and discipline
it."1
8.
Nor will this article consider what weapons the Second Amendment protects, or
when the government can legitimately curb the possession of arms. The purpose of this
article is to establish the fundamental rights recognized by the Second Amendment, not its
outer limits.
9.
For a thorough explanation of what the Founders intended by the militia clause
and why it in no way interferes with an individual right to arms, see Senate Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., The Right to
Keep and Bear Arms 4-5 (Comm. Print 1982) ("Report on the Constitution"); Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, PoliticalLiberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation,39 AlA L REv.
103 at 105-08 (1987); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y. (1986) 598, 598-600,
622-32.
10.
Donald Kates, Handgun Prohibitions and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L REv. 204, 212 (1984) (citing GEORGE D. NEWTON & FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, FIREARMS AND VIOIENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 113 (1970); John Levin, The Right to Bear
Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 Cm-KENT L REV. 1948 (1971);
Henigan, Arms, Anarchy & the Second Amendment, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 108 (1991); David C.
Williams, Civil Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment,
101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991); PoIicy GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIvm LIBERTIES UNION 95 (1986).
11.
The Constitution provides:
[15] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel invasions;
[16] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving
to the states respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
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Because the Civil War decided the course of
country would take, there is no longer any need
state-sponsored militia as a protection against a
army. The Second Amendment is obsolete, on par
Amendment's prohibition against the quartering
12
peacetime.

federalism our
to maintain a
large standing
with the Third
of troops in

C. Individual Rights
The individual rights position relies primarily on the "right of the
people" language in the Second Amendment to assert that
individuals, not states, have the protected interest. The Amendment
also recognizes certain militia rights. While the relevance of these
rights should not be ignored, it is not determinative of the
individual right the Founders acknowledged with the Second
Amendment.
An examination of English history clarifies what the framers
envisioned when drafting the Second Amendment. A general
requirement to possess arms and serve in the military in England is
traceable to at least 690 A-D.13 The tradition continued for
centuries, requiring noblemen, and later commoners, to keep arms
and comprise the militia. 4 This obligation to keep arms was not
solely for military service to the King; English subjects were also
required to provide police services. Citizens were obligated to
pursue criminals and guard their village to prevent crime.' 5
By the 1660's, however, the individual right to arms was
jeopardized. Charles II, and later James II, began to disarm many
Protestant subjects. 6 Because of the deep resentment James'
policies caused among both political and religious communities, he
fled England in what became known as the "Glorious Revolution." 7
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 15 & 16.
12.
Kates, supra note 10, at 212. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CONST., amend. DEL
13. Hardy, supra note 9, at 562 (citing 1 J. BAGLEY & P. RowLy, A DocumENTARY HiSTORY
OF ENGLAND (1066-1540) 152 (1965)).
14. Id. at 563-65.
15. Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
Law Tradition, 10 HAr1NGS CONST. LQ. 285, 291-92 (1983).
16.
Hardy, supra note 9, at 574-79.
17.
Id. at 579. Obviously a full explanation of the religious and political quarrels that
befell England in the Seventeenth Century is beyond the scope of this article, but they are
important in tracing both the common law right to bear arms and the consequences of the
government's interference with that right. For a thorough explanation of this time in
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As a result of this revolution, the English Bill of Rights was passed
in 1689, and the individual right to bear arms was codified. The Bill
provided that all Protestants "may have Arms for their Defence
suitable to their condition and as allowed by law."' 8 The right to
bear arms for self-defense and the right to petition the King were
the only individual rights the English Bill of Rights acknowledged;
all other parts of the Bill consisted of enumerated powers of
government.19
This right to bear arms was adopted by the American colonies.20
Complementing it was the requirement that all men between the
ages of sixteen and sixty be subject to military service.2 ' Many
colonial laws adopted the English tradition of not merely allowing,
but requiring, citizens to own guns. For example, a 1631 Virginia
law provided that "all men that are fittinge to beare armes, shall
bring their pieces to church .. ." for drill and target practice.2 2 By
1658, the law required every man to keep a functioning weapon in
the home. 23 These laws served the two-fold purpose of allowing
individual self-defense and giving Britain a reserve force to be
called in case of war.
English actions after the French and Indian War - increasing
taxes, discouraging expansion into the American interior, and
led to growing
stationing a large army in the colonies resentment toward the mother country. Editorials apoeared in
leading colonial newspapers, asserting that the colonists had a right
24
to arm themselves to fend off English injustice.
After the "Boston Tea Party," English soldiers attempted to
England's history, see 2 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES II
(11th ed., 1858); J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

(1928).
18.
1 W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). For an explanation of the meaning behind the
Catholic-Protestant distinctions in the English Bill 6f Rights, see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM,To KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS 122 (1994).
STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 46 (1994).
19.
20.
Nearly the entire body of English Law was adopted by the colonies. MALCOLM,
supra note 18, at 138.
21.
Id. at 139.
22.
Hardy, supra note 9, at 588 (citing I.W. HENNING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE

YEAR 1619 173-74 (1823) (reprinted 1969)).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 589-90. The Boston Evening Post argued that it was lawful for colonists to
take up arms in order to prevent British abuses. A week later, the New York Journal
Supplement called the right to keep arms a "natural right" and cited Blackstone for the
efficacy of guns in restraining the violence of oppression. Id. at 589-90 (citing 0. DICKERSON,
BOSTON UNDER MIrITARY RULE, xi, 17 (1936)).
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disarm the colonists. The English banned all exports of muskets
and ammunition to the colonies and began seizing the colonists'
weapons and ammunition. 25 This repression resulted in the
widespread formation of militia organizations, manned by colonists
wielding their own firearms. 26 In February 1775, colonial militia
prevented the English from seizing firearms at an armory in Salem,
Massachusetts; two months later, the English were repulsed at
Concord. 7 Distinguished leaders such as George Washington and
Samuel Adams were instrumental in organizing and mobilizing the
28
local militias.
The right to bear arms, long a tradition in England and the
colonies, was important in resisting the English army and
establishing our nation's independence. The war was fought mainly
by commoners who supplied the arms necessary to defeat the
British.29 It was not merely the benefit of arms that made an
impression on the Founders; the resentment evoked by the British
in their attempt to disarm the colonists had a lasting impact. 30 The
Revolutionary experience paralleled the abuses and disarmament
policies of the English monarchs from a century earlier. Like the
English in 1689, the Founders codified the individual right to arms
in order to prevent government tyranny.
D. Early State Constitutions
The early state constitutions are important to a thoughtful
understanding of the Second Amendment because they provide the
basis from which the Founders drafted the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. 3' The centuries-old right to possess arms and the bitterness
evoked by England's violation of that right before the Revolution
were apparent when the newly-formed states drafted constitutions.
Many state constitutions contain provisions regarding arms,
militias, and standing armies. For example, Pennsylvania's Bill of
Rights contained the protection that "People have a right to bear
arms for the defense of themselves, and the state."32
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 589-90.
HALBROO, supra note 19, at 60.
Hardy, supra note 9, at 591.
HALBROOK supra note 19, at 60.
Id. at 63.

30.

STEPHEN HALBROOK A RIGHT To BEAR ARMs 17 (1989).

31.
Id. at vii.
32.
PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776). Three other states explicitly recognized the
right to bear ans - North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts. HALBROOK supra note 30,
at ix.
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Other constitutions were not explicit about an individual right to
possess firearms. For example, while the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 mentioned that the right to keep and bear
arms was for the common defense, it also granted people the right
to defend life and liberty.- These latter rights would be
4
meaningless if people were not allowed to keep and bear arms.3
Among the states that did not mention a right to bear arms, two
phenomena stand out.3 5 First, because of the colonists' mistrust of
standing armies, every state created a general militia, composed of
nearly all adult men, as opposed to a select militia, which was
much closer to a standing army.3 6 A general militia, unlike a
government-sponsored militia, required citizens to provide their
own arms. To have a general militia and anything less than
universal arms ownership would be logistically impossible.
Second, even if an individual right to arms is not explicit, it is
assumed. The states that did not mention a right to possess arms
often mentioned the rights of life, liberty, and property, as well as
37
the peoples' right to defend life and property.
Six states did not have a bill of rights at all, and said nothing
about a right to bear arms. 38 From such an omission it cannot be
deduced that these states failed to recognize the right to bear arms;
such an inference would then force one to conclude that citizens
had no right to life, liberty, and property, which were also omitted.
Perhaps state leaders believed that their natural rights were
sufficiently protected, thereby eliminating the necessity of listing
them in a bill of rights.39 More likely was a fear that listing such
rights would give the government more control over individuals; it
might encourage the erroneous assumption that natural rights had
40
to be listed in order to receive protection.
33.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. 1, art. 17.
34.
HALBROOUU
supra note 30, at 42.
35. Id. at 51. The states that recognized a militia, but not an explicit individual right to
arms, included Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Hampshire.
36. Id. at 52.
37.
MALcoLM, supra note 18, at 148-49.
38. HALBROOK supra note 19 at ix. New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia
adopted constitutions but no bill of rights. Id. at 79. Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted
neither a constitution nor a bill of rights, but instead relied on their royal charters. Id. at 97.
39.
MALCOLM, supra note 18, at 148.
40. Id. at 149-50. New Jersey explicitly adopted the Common Law of England, a tactic
its leaders believed would sufficiently protect the colonists' natural rights. Id.
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The Constitution and the Bill of Rights

The Founding Fathers' belief in an individual right to possess
arms is further supported by the debates surrounding the
ratification of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. While
information about the proceedings is imperfect, the evidence is
overwhelming that the Founders supported an individual right to
possess firearms.
The Federalist Papers reveal that two of the most important
Founders, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, supported an
individual right to bear arms. Hamilton's The Federalist No. 28
argued that should government become tyrannical, "the citizens
must rush tumultuously to arms, without system, without recourse,
except in their courage and despair."4 ' In The Federalist No. 29,
Hamilton noted that a standing army might be needed in the future,
but it would never be able to abuse the people "while there is a
large body of citizens little if at all inferior to them in discipline
and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights
42
and those of their fellow citizens."
Madison, too, acknowledged the right to keep and bear arms. In
The Federalist No. 46, he explained that a federal army would
never be able to impose its will on the people if it had to oppose "a
militia amounting to near a half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands ... fighting for their common liberties.""
Other prominent Founders, such as Noah Webster, echoed
Madison's view: "Before a standing army can rule the people, the
people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom of
Europe. The Supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws
by the sword; because the whole body of the people is armed, and
constitutes a force superior to any bands of regular troops that can
be, on any pretense, raised in the United States." 44
This desire to guarantee that individuals maintain the right to
bear arms was developed further in the Bill of Rights. Madison
drafted the Bill of Rights based on a pamphlet that compiled
proposed amendments from state ratifying conventions. 45 No right
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
41.
THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 179-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
42.
THE FEDERALiST No. 46, at 320-21 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
43.
Noah Webster, An' Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
44.
Constitution (1787), reprinted in P.AwmzrMs ON THE CONSTITUION OF THE UNIrED STATES 56
(Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1888).
45.
Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in THE
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was more requested than the right to bear arms; it was requested
46
seven times, while freedom of speech appeared only three times.
When Madison introduced his proposed rights to the House of
Representatives, he interspersed them throughout the Constitution,
rather than adopt an appendix that listed the amendments
separately (like our present system). Madison placed the right to
bear arms, along with speech, religion, and free press, with the
other individual rights provisions contained in the Constitution,
such as those relating to a bill of attainder and ex-post facto laws.
The right was not placed with the militia clause of the
47
Constitution.
Of course, Madison's organizational plan was not implemented,
and the House passed a version of the Second Amendment similar
to its ratified form. There was no dissent expressed to this
measure, indicating that it was unthinkable that the right to bear
arms would be infringed. 48 The Senate did not leave official records
of its debates. However, the writings of John Randolph explain that
the Senate rejected a proposal that would limit the right to keep
and bear arms only for "the common defense," thereby indicating a
49
desire that the right not be confined merely to military activities.
That the Founders intended the Second Amendment to recognize
an individual right is likewise supported by its placement. As
mentioned above, Madison's original plan to group the individual
rights amendments together in the Constitution was not adopted.
However, these individual rights were clustered together in the Bill
of Rights. Adopting the collective rights school's explanation of the
Second Amendment requires reading the First Amendment as an
individual right, the Second Amendment as a state right, and the
remaining amendments as individual rights. Such a reading is
inconsistent with the Amendment's placement in the Bill of Rights.
The collective rights school also must explain why the Founders
used the term "people" to refer to individual rights in the First and
Fourth Amendments, while in the Second they meant to protect
only a state right. Such a reading is implausible and the Supreme
Court has held that "the people" refers to individuals in all of the
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy

and Dennis J. Mahoney, eds.,

1987).
46.
47.

Hardy, supra note 9, at 607.
Id. at 609.

48.

CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE 57 (1994).

49.

Id. at 58-59.

Second Amendment
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F

The Militia

As mentioned above, an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of
"militia" is beyond the scope of this article. Such analysis is
unnecessary to the individual rights school; whatever is meant by
"militia" does not negate the peoples' right to keep and bear arms.
At the risk of some repetition, this section will demonstrate that
nothing about the militia interferes with the individual right to bear
arms.
The militia system and the individual right to bear arms were
closely linked for hundreds of years before the Constitution. The
tradition was adopted from England, where citizens were required
to keep weapons and were subject to militia service for both
military and law-enforcement purposes. Both the arms and militia
aspect of this tradition were adopted in the American colonies. 51
The militia of the late 1700's bore no resemblance to the
organized, government-sponsored National Guard of today. National
Guard-like units were usually referred to as the "select militia."
Contrarily, references to the militia were almost always
synonymous with the "body of the people," indicating an armed
populace. 52 The state constitutions, drafted during and after the
Revolutionary War, used this body of the people wording to
describe militias.5
This terminology was also used by the Founders. For example,
George Mason asked "who are the militia, if they be not the people
M Tench Coxe, arguing that the nation need not
of this country?"5
fear a large standing army, mentioned "[t]he militia, who are in fact
the effective part of the people at large. . ."55 Alexander Hanson, a
member of the Maryland ratification committee, opined that if the
army grew too large, "could we not . . . depend on the militia,
50. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 258 (1990) (holding that the phrase
"the people," as used in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, applies to individuals.)
See also infra note 110, and accompanying text.
51.
Kates, supra note 10, at 214-18.
52. Hardy, supra note 9, at 623-24.
53. Id.
54.

JONATHAN ELUOT, THE DEBATE OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

OF THE FEDERAL CONsrruTiON, 3:425 (Burt Franklin, 1888). See CRAmER, supra note 48, at 9 for
an overview of the Founders' debates on the militia.
Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution for the United States of
55.
America, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 44, at 150-51.

838
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which is ourselves."56 The same Congress that ratified the Bill of
Rights also enacted the Militia Act of 1792, which defined the
militia to include all able-bodied males, aged 1845, and required
57
each man to own a weapon.
Common sense suggests that the Founders would not, in drafting
the Second Amendment, recognize a state military force yet fail to
protect an individual right to keep arms. In addition to the long
tradition of armed citizens comprising the militia, the Founders had
just fought the Revolutionary War. The nature of the conflict
involved armed colonists, organized in small units, fighting a legal
government. That the Founders then intended to drop the
individual right to arms, so long an integral part of the
Anglo-American tradition and the most requested right by state
conventions, in order to legitimize a state-imposed army violates
every tenet of common sense and rationality.
G. Conclusion
Evidence that the Founders desired an individual right to bear
arms is overwhelming. This individual right began with the
Founders' ancestors in England, who brought it to the new world.
England codified the individual right to bear arms after the
monarchy began to disarm the citizenry. Armed colonists proved
crucial to the early stages of the Revolutionary War, and the
English attempts to disarm the rebellious colonists provided a
lasting and bitter memory. Most states adopted an individual right
to bear arms in both their constitutions and bills of rights and later
adopted proposals calling for the Constitution to guarantee such
rights. The writings of Madison, Hamilton, and other Founders
premised the efficacy of the Constitution on an armed populace,
and evidence indicates that the Senate rejected a proposed
amendment that would have limited the right to bear arms. Finally,
the term "militia" does not preclude an individual right to arms.
II.

A.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

Introduction

The Second Amendment, which is no model of clarity, shines as
fine-tuned prose in comparison to the Supreme Court's
56.
Alexander Conte Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of Federal Government,
reprinted in PMpmmi, supra note 44, at 234-35.
57.
First Militia Act, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
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interpretation of it. To date, the Court has provided almost no help
to those interested in understanding the Second Amendment. Most
of its decisions are tangential to the right to bear arms - for
example, whether the Second Amendment protects private militias5.
or a citizen from being disarmed by another citizen.6 Not until
1939, and not since then, did the Court attempt to define the
Second Amendment's guarantees. 60 This dearth of cases can be
partially explained by the Court's deference to state laws before the
era of incorporation 1 as well as the lack of federal laws regulating
firearms. However, the Court's neglect of the Second Amendment
in the post-World War II era is inexcusable and leaves the nation
with no significant body of case law on the right to bear arms.
B. Reconstruction and Post-Reconstruction Cases
The first major case to explore the Second Amendment was
United States v. Cruikshank,62 which concerned members of a mob
indicted for invading a freedmen's meeting, at which they
confiscated the attendees' weapons and prevented them from
voting in a state election.6 The Supreme Court held that while the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents state infringement of some rights,
it does not protect citizens from infringements by other citizens.
Because the actions of the mob were purely private in nature, the
national government had no authority to intervene.64
While the case was dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction,
Cruikshank nonetheless raises several important points regarding
the post-Civil War Court's analysis of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court, in explaining its version of federalism,
relied on the Privileges and Immunities clause6 of the Constitution,
58. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
59. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
60. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
61. See infra note 93, and accompanying text for explanation of this doctrine.
62. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Second Amendment was first
acknowledged in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, Chief Justice
Taney warned that if free blacks became United States citizens, they could "keep and carry
arms wherever they went." Id. at 47. Note that Chief Justice Taney implicitly acknowledged
the individual rights nature of the Second Amendment.
63. 92 U.S. at 542-43.
64. Id. at 552.
65.
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. "Privileges and
immunities" referred only to those rights which were created by the Constitution, and thus
did not include natural rights. Report on the Constitution, supra note 9, at 9. Examples of
protected rights included voting in federal elections and interstate travel - rights which
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holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the protections
of the Bill of Rights against state action only to the extent that
those rights related to the national government. 66 For example,
peaceably assembling to petition Congress for a redress of
grievances is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state
interference; other parts of the First Amendment are not, because
they do not relate to the national government and thus were left
67
free to state regulation.
Holding that the Second Amendment was not incorporated
against state action, the Court added:
The right . . . of bearing arms for a lawful purpose . .. is
not a right granted by the Constitution; neither is it any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The
Second Amendment declares that [the right to bear arms] shall
not be infringed, but this means no more than that it shall not
be infringed by Congress. 68
The justices concluded that citizens should look to local law or
police to protect against violations.6
The holding in Cruikshank is irrelevant for modem times, useful
only as an example of archaic constitutional reasoning.7 0 However,
the Court recognized the individual nature of the Second
Amendment and, despite its use of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, explicitly stated that it was a right that could not be
infringed. Finally, it held that the right to bear arms existed
independent of, and antecedent to, the Constitution, a document
that merely recognized the pre-existing natural right to bear arms.
The Court's next Second Amendment case was Presser v.
Illinois.71 Presser had organized an armed "workers' militia" in
response to abuses and intimidation from the Illinois National
Guard. 72 Illinois indicted Presser for violating a statute that
were not "natural," but existed because of the federal government. Id. See The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
66.
92 U.S. at 546.
67.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 546
68.
Id. at 553.
69.
Id.
70.
Despite the death of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, some writers still use
Cruikshank to buttress their anti-gun position. CRAMER, supra note 48, at 125-26 (citing
Michael K Beard & Samuel L Fields, National Coalition to Ban Handguns Statement on the
Second Amendment). One wonders if the group would also use Cruikshank to argue against

the rights of free speech and free press.
71. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
72. Id. at 254.
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prohibited men not under state or federal authority from acting as
a private militia (which included bearing arms) without a license.
Presser sought legal relief, claiming that the Illinois statute violated
his Second Amendment rights.7 3
The Court sided with Illinois, and in dicta stated that the Second
Amendment inapplicable to the case. Citing Cruikshank, the Court
defined the Amendment as a limit only on the "power of Congress
and the national government, not upon the states."74 The Court,
however, acknowledged a limitation on state power by noting:
[A]U citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved
military force or the reserve militia of the United States as
well as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the
general government, as well as of its general powers, the
states cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in
question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and
bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their
rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general
75
government.
Whether the Court viewed the Second Amendment as conferring
rights on individuals, states, or both is uncertain; it never had
cause to explore the nature of the Amendment. Yet, the Court
noted that a state could not interfere with the individual right to
keep and bear arms when such regulation interfered with the
"public security" of the United States.
The value of Cruikshank and Presserin determining the scope of
the right to keep and bear arms is limited. While both cases
acknowledge an individual right to arms, they also hold the Second
Amendment inapplicable to states. The discussions of the Second
Amendment in each case were dicta, and the analysis of the right
to bear arms was decided well before the Bill of Rights was
incorporated to apply to states, a fact that presumably nullifies any
grant of state power to infringe the right to bear arms. Cruikshank
and Presser are nearly useless in clarifying what rights an
individual possesses under the Second Amendment today.
73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 265.

75.

Id.
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C. Other Supreme Court Cases, 1894-1914
The Supreme Court again considered whether the Second
Amendment limits state action in Miller v. Texas.7 6 Defendant,
Miller, was convicted of murder, and on appeal to the Supreme
Court contended that a Texas law allowing the warrantless arrest
of anyone carrying a weapon violated the Second and Fourth
Amendments. 77 The Court assumed that the Second Amendment
"only operates on the federal power," but added that the
Fourteenth Amendment might apply these restrictions to the
states. 78 Because the defendant had failed to raise the Fourteenth
Amendment issue at trial, however, the Court refused to consider
it, and the Second Amendment was assumed not to apply to the
states.79 Miller is essentially trivia as a Second Amendment case,
with its logic about limits only on the federal power long since
discredited.
The Court considered two other cases with Second Amendment
implications in this era. Robertson v. Baldwin ° concerned a group
of seamen who argued that the Bill of Rights prohibited their
forcible return to ship without due process. The Court held that the
Bill of Rights did not create new rights, but merely embodied
certain guarantees that derived from English common law. These
English common law rights had, "from time immemorial," been
subject to certain exceptions when necessity dictated.8 1 Among
these rights, and exceptions, was the individual right to arms: "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms (Article 2) is not
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. "82
The justices listed other rights that fell into this category, such as
the rights to free speech and press and a prohibition against double
jeopardy."'
The Court in Robertson categorized the Second Amendment as
individual in nature; not only is it listed with individual rights, but a
law against concealed weapons would not make sense if applied to
a militia. Also significant is the fact that the Court again recognized
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
Id. at 281
Id. at 282.
Id. at 281-82.

1998

Second Amendment

843

this right as predating the Constitution - a common law right that
the Founders had not created but rather acknowledged and clearly
stated was not to be infringed.
Guns, but not the Second Amendment, were the issue in Patsone
v. Pennsylvania.8 Patsone concerned a Pennsylvania statute that
made it illegal for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to "kill
any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property"
and thus prohibited such a person from owning a rifle or shotgin.85
The Court upheld the statute, and with Justice Holmes writing for
the majority, held "the prohibition does not extend to weapons
such as pistols that may be supposed to be needed occasionally for
self-defense."8
Holmes seemed to indicate that because pistols are necessary to
protect an individual, they are not subject to legislative restrictions.
However, he could have meant that a law which prohibited hunting
could not, absent specific language, be used to ban pistols,
weapons rarely for that purpose.
The cases from this era are minor, and do little to clarify the
meaning of the Second Amendment. Miller was decided before the
Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply to states. Patsone is ambiguous and its language about
weapons is only tangential to the decision. Robertson is of some
value, for it implicitly recognizes the individual right to bear arms
as well as the right as predating the Constitution. However,
Robertson's discussion of the right is dicta and hardly provides a
convincing precedent from which to derive an individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment.
D. United States v. Miller
After Patsone, the Court was silent on the Second Amendment
for twenty-five years until United States v. Miller.87 Miller was a
challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934, under which the
defendants were accused of transporting unregistered sawed-off
shotguns across state lines. The district court sided with the
defendants, taking judicial notice of the fact that a sawed-off
shotgun was a militia weapon, and federal prohibition of such a
84.

Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).

85.

Id. at 143.

86.

Id. at 144.

87.

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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weapon would violate the Second Amendment. 88
The government appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but
dropped all charges against the defendants. As a result, no brief
was filed in opposition to the government's appeal. 89 The Supreme
Court reversed the district court, holding that Miller must produce
evidence showing that a sawed-off shotgun had some "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia." In the absence of such evidence, the Court could not take
judicial notice that the weapon was ordinary military equipment. 90
The Court also stated that the "obvious purpose" of the Second
Amendment was to provide for the militia; but what was the
militia?91 The constitutional debates "show plainly enough that the
militia comprised all males capable of acting in concert for the
common defense ... [a]nd further, that ordinarily when called for
service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied
92
by themselves and of the Idnd in common use at the time."
While the Miller Court focussed on the "militia" aspect of the
Amendment, it did not deny an individual right to bear arms.
Rather, the Court's definition of militia is actually helpful to an
individual rights position. By defining the militia to include "all
males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense," the Court endorsed a broad view of who could possess
arms. While Miller held that the Second Amendment relates to the
militia, the practical effect is to create a well-armed populace - a
scenario endorsed by the individual rights view. In addition, the
Court never mentioned the national guard; common sense dictates
that had the Court meant an organized, disciplined group such as
the Guard, it would have specifically referred to such a group and
not used the above "body of the people" definition.
Miller, then, could both help and harm the competing views of
the Second Amendment. The individual rights school must accept
that in the Court's only major Second Amendment case, it did not
explicitly recognize an individual right to arms. However, the
collective rights view may have won a Pyrrhic victory. By defining
"militia" to include the body of the people, the Court seemed to
endorse widespread ownership of guns - much as the Founders
had intended.
88.

Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.

CRAMER,

supra note 48, at 188.
307 U.S. at 178.
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
Id. at 179.
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The practical significance of Miller is limited, because the
decision provides no insight in clarifying the relationship among the
individual, government, and firearms. Unfortunately, Miller is the
Court's latest word on the Second Amendment. By stopping its
interpretations of the Second Amendment with Miller in 1939, the
Court has effectively washed its hands of one of the most
important issues of the post-World War II era.
E.

Is the Second Amendment Incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Many of the cases mentioned above, e.g., Miller v. Texas,
Cruikshank, and Presser,interpreted the Second Amendment as a
restraint only on federal - not state, local, or private interference with the right to bear arms. These cases were decided
over one hundred years ago, before the Supreme Court began to
rule that the Bill of Rights is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore applicable to states. By refusing to take
a Second Amendment case, the Court has not only confused the
right to bear arms, but also failed to decide whether the
Amendment applies to states. While nearly all provisions of the Bill
of Rights have been explicitly incorporated, 93 the Second
Amendment has not. Many federal courts have ruled that the
Second Amendment is not incorporated.94 However, the arguments
favoring incorporation are so strong that to hold otherwise is
inconsistent and intellectually dishonest.
An example of the misinterpretation of the incorporation
doctrine is found in Quilci v. Morton Grove, the most famous
gun-control case of the post-war era 9 5 In 1981, Morton Grove,
Illinois, banned the private ownership of handguns and was sued
by local gun owners who sought to stop enforcement of the law.96
The federal district court granted Morton Grove summary
judgment, and Quilci appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
93.
The Court has never accepted a "total incorporation" theory. Instead, it has
employed a "selective incorporation" test, incorporating rights on a piecemeal basis. TRIBE,
supra note 6, at 721. The only amendments that have not explicitly been incorporated are
the Second and Third Amendments, the Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement, and the
Seventh Amendment Id.
United States v. Nelson, 859 F2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988); Quilci v. Village of Morton
94.
Grove, 695 F2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Oakes,
564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
695 E2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
95.
96. Id. at 262-63.
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Quilci contended that: 1) the Supreme Court in Presser had
recognized that a state could not prohibit people from bearing
arms; and 2) Presser's holding that the Second Amendment does
not apply to states had been overruled, because the Second
Amendment - implicitly, the whole Bill of Rights - had been
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and several cases.97
98
The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments.
Quilci provided an excellent opportunity for the Court to clarify
the right to keep and bear arms. Unfortunately, its failure to grant
certiorari not only resulted in an extension of the gun control
debate, but also a continuation of the incorporation question, a
matter that could have, and should have, been decided years ago.
To cite Presser for the proposition that the Second Amendment is
not incorporated requires relying on a method of constitutional
reasoning that the Court has rejected for decades. Presser is
inconsistent with today's incorporation doctrine, which applies the
Bill of Rights to state and local governments.9
The Supreme Court has unfairly burdened the individual rights
school by utilizing its "selective incorporation" approach to the Bill
of Rights. Because the Court refuses to hear right to bear arms
cases, it cannot incorporate the Second Amendment. This places
the individual rights school in a bind. Although the school has a
plausible argument for why the Amendment should be considered
incorporated, it must acknowledge that the Court has never done
so. However, when the Court takes a Second Amendment case in
the future, there is ample reason to believe that it will incorporate

right.
In deciding whether a provision of the Bill of Rights is
incorporated, the Supreme Court has traditionally asked: (1) How
deeply is the right rooted in our Anglo-American heritage? 1' ° and
(2) How greatly did the Founders value the right? 1 1 Regarding the
individual right to bear arms, the response to both questions is
overwhelmingly positive. 10 2 The records of the Founding Fathers
show that they valued the right to bear arms highly. In addition, the
97.
Id. at 270.
98.
Id.
99.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 307 U.S. 643 (1961);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
100.
Kates, supra note 10, at 253 n.211 (discussing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1960)).
101.
Id. at 254 n.214 (discussing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)).
102. See supra notes 31-50, and accompanying text.
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right had been part of the English tradition for centuries and
passed to the colonies in the Seventeenth Century.10 3
Only an au contrario argument against incorporation is
consistent - the Second Amendment grants states the right to
have a militia, and holding that a state militia is not subject to state
regulations would be contradictory. However, as explained above,
the Founders' main intent in drafting the Second Amendment was
not to grant states the right to create their own militias, but instead
to recognize an individual right to bear arms.
Opponents of the right to bear arms often claim that the Second
Amendment is not incorporated. While they are correct that the
Court has never explicitly incorporated the Second Amendment,
they also must acknowledge that the Court has not heard a right to
bear arms case in several decades. According to the Court's own
incorporation test, as well as the demise of the Privileges and
Immunities clause, the Second Amendment is immune from state
and local infringement. The foolish debate over incorporation is yet
another consequence of the Court's unwillingness to hear a Second
Amendment case.
F

Post-Miller Developments

The Court's inexplicable failure to decide a Second Amendment
case since Miller is irresponsible, given society's tumultuous debate
about guns and the abundance of lower court cases from which to
choose. In a recent decision, however, it provided support for
interpreting the Second Amendment as applying to individuals and
also offered a glimpse of how it might decide a right to bear arms
case in the future.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'°4 held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of property
located in a foreign country and owned by nonresident aliens. 10 5 In
exploring the phrase "the right of the people" in the Fourth
Amendment, the Court noted that "the people" was a "term of art"
employed in select parts of the Constitution, including the
Preamble and the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
103.
There is also evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
that the Second Amendment apply to states. Kates, supra note 10, at 256. One reason the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed was in response to the "black codes" states used to
deprive blacks of their right to bear arms. Id.
104.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 258 (1990).
105.
Id. at 259.
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Amendments.' 6 This textual analysis suggests that the term refers
to "a class of persons who are part of a national community." °7
The case vindicates an individual rights view of the Second
Amendment. The Court did not mention any limitations on this
"right of the people" imposed by a militia; instead, it is classified
with other "obvious" individual rights, which use the same
terminology as the Second Amendment. 108
Verdugo-Urquidez does not strike a decisive blow for the
individualist school, but does provide evidence that the Court might
interpret the Second Amendment in the way the Founders
intended. That the Court implicitly views the Second Amendment in
the same manner as the First and Fourth Amendments is long in
coming. It is implausible that the Founders would have accorded
"the people" more than one meaning, and the Court's decision
validates the idea that language should be read consistently
throughout the Constitution.
G.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has done the country a great disservice by
not accepting a Second Amendment case in the last several
decades. To make an argument that relies heavily on any previous
Supreme Court decision risks exposing such a position to plausible
counter-argument, for the opinions are illogical, contradictory,
ambiguous and, in some cases, based upon discarded judicial
doctrines. While Verdugo-Urquidez indicates how the Court might
rule in a future Second Amendment case, it must first accept such
a case. 1' 9 At present, the body of Second Amendment case law is
virtually nothing. That is why necessity dictates a new approach be
106. Id.
107. Id. at 259-60.
108.
The Court's holding that the phrase "the people" applies to individuals "who are
part of the national community" does not mean that the other amendments do not provide
an individual right The Court specifically mentioned the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as
individual rights that are fundamental to any individual and do not attach only to United
States citizens. Id. at 261.
109.
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Printz v. United States, seemed
eager for the Court to accept such a Second Amendment case. He noted that if the Second
Amendment protects an individual right, the federal government would be prohibited from
regulating the intrastate aspects of the sale and possession of firearms. Prinz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2386 (1977) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas added,
"Perhaps, at some future date this court will have the opportunity to determine whether
Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has justly been
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.'" Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY,
COMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTON 708 (1833) (reprinted 1987)).
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utilized in interpreting the individual right to arms.
Im.

TOWARD A NEW READING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: DESHANEY
V. WINNEBAGO COUNTY DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS.

A.

Introduction

Section I explained the Founders' intention that individuals have
the right to keep and bear arms. The arguments advanced
concerned both political and self-protective motives. The Founders
themselves did not distinguish between "personal safety" and
"political safety" reasons for the individual right to keep and bear
arms." 0 One justification is that America had no organized police
force at the time of its founding. Like their English counterparts,
American citizens had to serve in both "militia" and "police" roles
when the situation required."' Of course, America was primarily a
rural culture at that time, so a spirit of self-reliance was inherent
among many people on the frontier.
Conditions have changed considerably since the 1790's. Although
there is still ample reason to distrust the government, the more
immediate threat of physical harm comes from individuals. Because
the Court has steadfastly refused to hear Second Amendment
cases, Americans are uncertain what rights, if any, they possess to
respond to this growing threat.
The Court, however, has laid the foundation for a decisive
victory for the individual rights view. While this article strongly
encourages the Court to take Second Amendment cases, its failure
to do so will not foreclose a winning argument in favor of the
individual right to arms. Surprisingly, the parties engaged in the
gun debate have failed to grasp the significance of a Supreme
Court case that has effectively defined the individual right to bear
2
arms question, yet at no time mentions the Second Amendment."
3
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs."
concerned a young boy, Joshua DeShaney, left severely retarded
110. Lund, supra note 9, at 117.
111. Id. at 118.
112.
To be precise, DeShaney has been overlooked by almost everyone. William Van
Alstyne mentions it in a footnote, and indicates that its holding seems inconsistent with
William Blackstone's residual natural rights theory. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 1248 n. 43.
Two other authors mention DeShaney, briefly noting its limitation on government
responsibility. T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The Melting
Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRn L 764, 800 (1995); Thomas Moncure, Jr., The Second
Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. W. 589, 596 (1991).
113. 489 U.S. 187 (1989).
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after a severe beating from his father. Members of the defendant
Department of Social Services ("DSS") were aware of the prolonged
abuse and took some minimal steps to protect Joshua, but failed to
remove him permanently from his father's custody." 4 Despite ample
evidence - including hospital reports - that Joshua was being
abused, the case worker handling the matter did nothing more than
to "dutifully record" the incidents and her own suspicions about
the abuse." 5 Several months later, the father beat him so severely
6
that he lapsed into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage."
After the injury, Joshua's mother sued the DSS, a subdivision of the
state, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."1 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that
the D.S.S. had deprived Joshua of his liberty interest in his bodily
integrity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
protect him from abuse that they knew, or should have known, was
8
occurring."
B.

The Majority Opinion

In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held
that the state's failure to protect an individual from private violence
generally is not a violation of the Due Process Clause," 9 which acts
as a limitation on the state's power to act, not a guarantee of
114. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191-92. Joshua had been placed in temporary custody at a
Wisconsin hospital. A DSS "child protection team" then enrolled the child in a pre-school
program, provided his father with counseling services, and encouraged the father's girlfriend
.to leave the home. Joshua's father promised that he would cooperate with the DSS in
accomplishing these goals, but he failed to do so. Id.
115. Id. at 192-93.
116. Id.
117. Id. Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the persons injured in an action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Note that Section 1983, as a purely remedial statute, does not itself provide a cause of
action. A party must prove a violation of a federally secured right - such as a liberty
interest provided by the Fourteenth Amendment - in order to prevail in a § 1983 suit.
118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
119.
Id. at 195. There are exceptions to this. The Court acknowledged that a state
could not deny protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 197 n.3 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). A
government service might also become an "entitlement" which could not be deprived without
due process of law. Such a guaranteed right would have to be created by statute. 489 U.S. at
196 n.2 (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). In addition,
for an explanation of the "special relationship" theory, see infra note 122, and accompanying
text.
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certain minimal levels of safety. While the state may not deprive
individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law,
it is not obligated to ensure that those interests are not harmed
through other means. 120 "Its purpose [is] to protect the people from
the State, not to ensure that the State [protect] them from each
other. The framers were content to leave the extent of
governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic
2
political process." '
Furthermore, the Court also declined to hold that the state's
knowledge of Joshua's danger and its express willingness to help
him constituted any type of "special relationship" leading to an
affirmative constitutional duty to protect him. The plaintiff argued
that a "special relationship" existed because the DSS was aware of
Joshua's dangerous situation and "specifically proclaimed" its
intention to protect him against the danger.122 By attempting to
shield Joshua from abuse, the state acquired a duty to protect him.
The state's failure to discharge this duty, according to plaintiff,
constituted a substantive due process violation. 123
The Court disagreed, stating that "[tihe affirmative duty to
protect arises not from the state's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help, but from the
limitation that it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf."' A The majority defined such a limitation narrowly, finding
it applicable only to situations where the state takes an individual
25
into custody thereby preventing him from taking care of himself.'
Such was not the case in DeShaney. The Court stated that "[wihile
the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in
the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do
" 126
anything to make him more vulnerable to them.
The reasoning in DeShaney represents an excellent opportunity
for the individual rights position. DeShaney sets the parameters of
the gun debate by defining the government's obligations, rather
120. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
121. Id. at 196.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 200.
125.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. See Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982)
(holding that involuntarily committed mental patients have a Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to have the state provide "reasonable safety" for themselves and others);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires
states to provide adequate medical care to prisoners).
126.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
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than a citizen's rights. From this, one would turn traditional Second
Amendment analysis on its head. Rather than supporting an
individual right to arms by citing virtually nonexistent Second
Amendment case law, DeShaney opens the door for much more
dynamic arguments and potentially shifts the burden of persuasion
in right to arms cases.
DeShaney holds that government has no obligation to protect
individuals from the violence of others. A realistic assessment of
that holding is that, as a general rule, the government has no
obligation to prevent murders, rapes, and armed robberies.
Assuming that, as humans, we have a right to life and liberty, 12 the
Court has left the protection of these rights solely to the individual.
By declining to guarantee protection to citizens, the government
forces individuals to protect themselves. The role of the Second
Amendment becomes apparent - individual protection is not
possible without the right to own firearms. An individual has no
chance to prevent, or even deter, an armed murderer from acting if
he is not also armed.
The above analysis suggests that DeShaney, unwittingly, is the
most important Second Amendment case ever decided by the
Supreme Court. By clarifying the government's obligation (or lack
of) to protect citizens, the Court has virtually mandated that the
Second Amendment be read as an individual right. Any other
interpretation of the Amendment would mean that the rights of life
and liberty are not rights at all, but mere empty promises to be
provided at the government's whim. 128 This is hardly radical. It is
exactly what the Founders intended when they ratified the Second
Amendment over two-hundred years ago. Although the Second
Amendment has been subject to numerous interpretations,
DeShaney necessitates that it be read as an individual right - a
127.
A "right" is defined in the abstract as "justice, ethical correctness, or consonance
with the rules of law or morals." BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 1486 (6th ed. 1990). In the concrete
sense, it is "a power, privilege, faculty, or demand inherent in one person and incident upon
another... [they exist antecedent] to their recognition by positive law." Id.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive an individual of life and
liberty (as well as property). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. While that generally applies to state
action, as DeShaney indicates, the Amendment shows the inherent value of these rights.
The preamble to the Constitution states that the purpose of the document is to "establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility . . . promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty." U.S. CONST. preamble. It is fair to assume that the Founders would have
considered rape and murder as two activities we have the right to prevent.
128. This does not mean that if the government were obligated to protect us, we
would lose the individual right to arms. We have the right, regardless of what the
government obligates itself to do.
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right that allows one to defend oneself against the violence of
129
others.
Members of the collective rights view might still argue against
allowing citizens the right to defend themselves with firearms.
However, because DeShaney obliges the government to do nothing
to protect its citizens, this view cannot withstand close scrutiny. If
the government generally has no obligation to protect a citizen,
how can a just society prevent an individual from arming to protect
himself? Under a ban on individual possession of firearms, the
government would have a monopoly on all forms of protection, and
an individual would be at the government's mercy for the
protection he receives. An individual would be caught in a
quandary: if he obeys the law, he risks being wounded or slain. All
hope for survival rests solely with the government. Yet should the
police fail to protect him, even if they are aware of dangers he
faces, the government is absolved of all responsibility and is
immune from liability. The government therefore has no incentive
to protect the lives of its citizens, and a citizen who protects his
life becomes a criminal.
The forced surrendering of the right to defend oneself is
incompatible with social contract theory, upon which much of
modern political theory, and to a great extent, the United States
Government, is based. 13° Social contract theory contemplates that
we exist independent of, and in competition with, one another in a
state of nature, with no law to govern us. By forming the social
contract, we enter into a societal agreement that requires that we
surrender some of our freedoms enjoyed in the state of nature. In
return, we receive political rights and government services that
129.
Nicholas J. Johnson argues that even if the Second Amendment protects only a
collective right (which he does not concede), an individual right to arms might still be found
in the Ninth Amendment. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An
Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 1 (1992).
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX. Johnson contends that the Ninth Amendment protects those unenumerated rights
deemed fundamental to the Founders. Id. at 27. Given the vast evidence proving that the
Founders considered such a right fundamental, it might be "substantially easier" to derive
the individual right to arms through the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 36.
130.
Thomas Jefferson claimed that the Declaration of Independence and Bill of
Rights had their origins in "the elementary book of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke,
Sidney, etc." THOMAs JEFFERSON, LIVING THOUGHTS (Dewey ed., 1940). See also CARL BECKER,

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922). For an overview of the role of philosophy as it
relates the right to bear arms, see Stephen Halbrook, The Second Amendment as a
Phenomenon of ClassicalPolitical Philosophy, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE (DONALD ,ATES ED.,
1984).
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supposedly make us safer and better able to function
interdependently.1 3 1
Yet not even the most authoritarian of the social contract
theorists would ever allow an individual to surrender the right to
defend his life. For example, Hobbes considered it a sacred right
that "[bly all means we can, to defend ourselves." 132 In fact, he
considered the right so fundamental that it could not be waived by
the social contract with the sovereign: "a covenant not to defend
myself from force, by force, is always voyd." 133 Man is guided by
the passions, and the greatest of these passions is fear of violent
death at the hands of another; this is the fundamental right from
which all natural law originates, and no government-made law may
supersede it.' 3"
Perhaps the most influential of liberal thinkers,'3 John Locke,
also recognized that individuals have a fundamental right to protect
their lives, a right with which the government cannot interfere: "[I]t
being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that
which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law
of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible when all
cannot be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred
"136

What is Locke's reason for this? "[B]ecause such men are not
under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule,
but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of
prey .. 137
Locke, like Hobbes, recognized that no agreement with the
sovereign could waive this right of self-defense: "This freedom from
absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely tied with, a
man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what he
forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man not having the
power of his own life cannot be compact, for his own consent
enslaves himself to anyone, nor put himself under the absolute
arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he
131.
THoMAS HOBBES, LEViATHAN (1651) (reprinted Cambridge ed. 1991); JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690) (reprinted Hackett ed. 1980); LEO STAuSS, THE
POLITICAL PHIOSOPHY OF HOBBES (1953); LEO STRAuSs, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1960).
132.
HOBBES, supra note 131, at 109.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 112.
135.
See Terrence J. Moore, The Ninth Amendment: Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEW
ENG. L. REv.1, 15 (1972).

136.
137.

LocKE, supra note 131, at 14.
Id. at 16.
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pleases. "138
It is not merely the liberal political philosophers who have
viewed self-protection as a fundamental right. This was also the
conclusion of William Blackstone, who contended that preventing a
citizen from defending himself is incompatible with liberty.
Blackstone divided individual rights into two categories: "primary"
and "auxiliary."3 9 The former consisted of those inherent rights that
a person enjoys, such as security, property, and liberty, while the
latter consists of rights used to protect primary rights, including
courts of law, the right to petition, and "the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defense." 140 Blackstone also
stated, "[If a person is attacked] ...it is lawful for him to repel the
attack by force.... [The law] considers that the future process of
law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied
by force . . . Self-defense, therefore, as it is justly called by the
primary laws of nature . . . [cannot] be taken away by the law of
141
society."
American history provides examples of government failure to
protect individuals or groups, forcing them to defend themselves.
Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond document the value of
firearms in curbing violence committed by racist whites in the
South, violence that the government did little to prevent. 142 This
threat was real. Between 1882 and 1968, approximately 75% of the
4,743 persons lynched were black.' 43 The authors also explain that
the goal of the "black codes" was the disarmament of blacks,
thereby preventing them from asserting their rights.' 44 By using
weapons to defend their lives and property, blacks were often
successfully able to decrease violent attacks against them.' 45
138. Id. at 23.
139.
1 WnLIAM BLAcKsToNE CoMmENTAiEs 129, 141 (1766).
140. Id. at 44.
141. 3 WnLIAM BLAcKSToNE CommENTARmEs 4 (1766).
142. Robert Cottrol & Raymond Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration,80 GEO. LJ. 309 (1991). The authors also note that the
Supreme Court sanctioned this violence. Id. at 318 (citing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629 (1882) (holding that a federal criminal statute designed to protect equal privileges and
immunities for blacks from invasion by private parties was unconstitutional); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
143.
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 141, at 352 (citing STEPHEN J. WH]TEFIELD, A DEATH
IN THE DELTA, THE STORY OF EMMETT TiL. 5 (1988)).

144.
Id. at 344.
145.
Id. at 353-54. Granted, this strategy worked when blacks fought as a group
against white mob violence. They were less successful when one armed black man was
attacked by a mob. Id. This fact makes the right no less valuable, and, as with all firearms
data, the deterrent effect cannot be measured.
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The value of a firearm in the face of obvious violence that the
government is unable, and not obligated, to prevent is clear in
other contexts. For example, what of the abortionist targeted for
execution by a pro-life extremist? Or the abused wife hiding from a
husband who has threatened to kill her? What if she has already
called the police several times, and they are unwilling, or unable, to
respond immediately? While these scenarios are more the
exception than the norm, they are examples of how total reliance
on the police can result in death, and why gun control cannot be
reconciled with the law as interpreted in DeShaney.
DeShaney thus not only requires a strong individual rights view
of the Second Amendment, it also severely damages the collective
rights view by exposing the glaring weaknesses of its argument. It
forces that latter position to concede that life and liberty are not
rights that the Constitution allows to be enforced by either private
or public means. The Constitution does not, and should not,
guarantee that a person's rights to life and liberty will be free from
private interference. But under the collective rights view, a person
would be prevented from defending his rights to life and liberty.
This position thus relegates life and liberty to mere "goals" or
"good intentions" - certainly not rights, which require some type of
enforcement. Such a position is incompatible with liberal theory,
ignores the foundations of modem jurisprudence, and rejects the
evidence of history.
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

The collective rights view, in order to avoid the dangerous
implications of its position as explained above, might argue that
DeShaney was incorrectly decided and that the dissent was correct:
government inaction can become action, thereby creating a duty to
protect citizens. This view, no matter how persuasive, does not
change the law of the land, which requires individuals to protect
themselves from the violence of others. However, even if Justice
Brennan's dissent became law, the ultimate result would still be an
individual right to arms.
In his dissent, Brennan took issue with the majority's suggestion
that only physical control was "the affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf."1 46 He argued that
the decisions upon which the Court relied essentially held that "if a
146.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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state cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses to aid itself, 1it47
cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction."
Other cases, too, "have acknowledged that a state's actions - such
as the monopolization of a particular path of relief - may impose
upon the state certain positive duties."' 48 The Court has also found
that the state can contribute to an injury, even if it did not cause
the harm itself.149
Brennan added that a state's prior actions may decide the
constitutional significance of its inactions. 150 In DeShaney,
Wisconsin law directed citizens to depend on the DSS, and the
decision about whether or not to remove the child rested solely
with the government agency, the DSS. He further noted: "Through
its child welfare program . . . Wisconsin has relieved ordinary
citizens and governmental bodies other than [DSS] of any sense of
obligation to do anything more than report their suspicions of child
abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no one
will step in to fill the gap."' 5 '
The result, Brennan acknowledged, was that the DSS had
effectively condemned Joshua to a life of abuse until it decided to
intervene. He added, "[c]onceivably, then, children like Joshua are
made worse off by the existence of this program when the persons
and entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs." 152
This could be tantamount to state action, and Brennan argued that
the plaintiffs should be able "to show that the [DSS's] failure to
help [Joshua] arose, not at the sound exercise of professional
judgement . . .but from the kind of arbitrariness we have in the
past condemned."' 53
Brennan's description of the DSS is analogous to the police and
their obligation to citizens in situations where guns have been
banned. With gun control, the government has "cut off private
sources of aid," monopolized a particular path of relief, directed
citizens to rely solely on it, and retains ultimate power in deciding
"147. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Id.; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
149. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1968); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
150. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (recognizing entitlement to welfare under state law)); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (implicitly rejecting the idea that welfare is a fundamental right).
151. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 211 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153.

Id.
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whether to intervene. True, police protection is not a fundamental
right. However, if the government forces people to rely solely on
the police, and precludes people from defending themselves, the
Brennan theory would recognize state action. By his own words,
Brennan has constructed a model of government duty and control
that could be tantamount to state action, thereby creating liability
for damages under section 1983.
Brennan's model of government obligation was implemented in a
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided soon after DeShaney.
The case provides an example of what might be expected if the
dissenting position in DeShaney is followed. In Wood v.
1
Wood was a passenger in a car that the police
M
Ostrander,
stopped for a minor infraction. The police arrested the driver for
drunk driving and then impounded the car. Wood claimed that the
officer left her at the site of the arrest, a notorious high-crime area,
and refused to help her get home. She was raped later that evening
after accepting a ride with a stranger.'5 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that Wood had raised triable issues of fact regarding whether the
police conduct had affirmatively placed her in a position of danger.
The court noted that this was a situation that was distinct from
DeShaney, a case where the state had "played no part in creating
the danger." 56 Because the policeman "had arrested [the driver],
impounded his car, and stranded Wood in a high crime area at 2:30
[a.m.] distinguishes Wood from the general public and triggers a
duty of the police to afford her some measure of peace and
57
safety."
The court also noted that Wood had raised a triable issue
regarding the defendant's knowledge of the danger. Because the
defendant had been a police officer for several years, he might be
chargeable with knowledge of the high crime rate in the area.
Brennan added: "Moreover, the inherent danger facing a woman left
alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense."1
Wood shows that the activity of police can be construed as
"creating the danger" an individual faces, even if that danger comes
from a third party. Note that the policeman did nothing illegal because of a probable crime, he removed an adult passenger from
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938, (1990).
Wood, 879 E2d at 586.
Id. at 590.
Id.
"Id.
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a car and left her in the neighborhood into which she had traveled.
Because of this action, Ostrander was potentially liable for
damages on the issue of whether he, as a state actor, created the
danger faced by the plaintiff.
Wood shows the practical effect of the dissent's position in
DeShaney. While the two cases are factually distinct, both positions
stand for government inaction being construed as action, thus
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. In neither case did the
government actually commit the offense. In both cases, however,
the government: failed to rescue an individual from a dangerous
situation; had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, of that
situation; monopolized the path of relief for the individual; had
ultimate power in deciding to intervene; and made the individual
worse off because of its inaction. These factors, according to the
Brennan-Wood model, raise triable issues of fact as to whether state
inaction becomes state action.
As explained above, the Brennan-Wood model is also analogous
to the government's failure to prevent crime in an area with strict
gun control. The result of such a liability system would be
unsustainable for any length of time. True, Justice Brennan
promised that courts would defer to the decision-maker's
professional judgement. Wood showed how willing the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was to defer to a state actor's
professional judgement.
If only a fraction of violent crimes led to civil suits against the
government, most jurisdictions would be unable to pay the
resulting large damage awards. More likely, cities would not risk
going to trial, thereby resulting in out-of-court settlements. This
liability would eventually force most governments to forgo the
"monopolization of relief" system designed by banning guns and
forcing reliance on the police - in essence, partially privatizing the
159
role the police play in protecting our lives.
D.

Conclusion

Regardless of the side one chooses as just in DeShaney, the
result is the same - an individual right to bear arms. This result is
reached on justice grounds if one sides with the majority. By
159.
This does not mean that the police would no longer have a role in protecting
individuals. Instead, the police could no longer be held liable pursuant to section 1983 for
failing to prevent serious harm which otherwise might not have occurred if a person were
able to defend himself.
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exempting government from the responsibility of upholding our
rights from violations by third parties, the Court has effectively
placed the responsibility of self-defense on the individual. Rights
are meaningless if unenforceable. Hence, an individual rights view
of the Second Amendment is required. This scenario is hardly
radical; but rather it is the view of society that the Founders had
two-hundred years ago.
The collective rights view might ignore the individual rights view
of the Second Amendment mandated by DeShaney. A gun ban
coupled with the DeShaney holding, however, would result in the
government's monopolization of the ability to protect life, with no
legally enforceable method to guarantee that protection, or recover
damages when the protection fails. Not only does this force the
collective rights view to take a virtually indefensible position; it
also flagrantly violates the foundations of modem government and
ignores history.
Even if one agrees with the dissent in DeShaney, the same result
is reached, but through economic impact. If the state assumes the
duty to protect an individual and forecloses any private form of
protection, its inaction can become state action - leaving it liable
for damages. These damages could not be sustained over time and
would result in the partial privatization of the government's role in
our lives.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article argues that the Second Amendment provides an
individual right to bear arms. The evidence that the Founders
intended an individual right is overwhelming, and the location
within the Bill of Rights as well as the terminology of the Second
Amendment indicates that it was meant as an individual right. The
Court has been derelict in its duty to interpret the Second
Amendment. Nearly every decision it has rendered contains
language that can help and harm both sides of the gun debate. It
has also left unclear whether the Second Amendment applies to the
states. This confusion may cease, for a recent decision lists the
Second Amendment as an individual right. Yet because the Court
refuses to take Second Amendment cases, a new approach is
necessary. The implications of DeShaney point to an individual
right to keep and bear arms, and limited government responsibility,
exactly as the Founders envisioned. This result is achieved,
regardless of whether the holding of the majority or the dissent
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became the rule of law.
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